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25 novembre 2012 7 25 /11 /novembre /2012 08:27

 

vient de paraître aux éditions Mare et Martin:

 

 

138x190_couv-1-.jpg

 

Histoire constitutionnelle des États-Unis

Une fédération non démocratique 1776-1860

Arnaud Coutant

L'actuelle constitution américaine date de 1787. Sa longévité qui s’explique par son adaptabilité a une conséquence essentielle en matière constitutionnelle : contrairement à la France, le droit constitutionnel et l’histoire constitutionnelle se mêlent intimement aux États-Unis. Le droit applicable s’inspire de plus de 200 ans de débats, de discussions et de conflits.

Le présent ouvrage est le premier tome d’une histoire constitutionnelle américaine qui a pour but de présenter les principaux textes et de les analyser. S’inspirant des travaux documentaires, assez répandus aux États-Unis, ce livre reproduit en langue originale les textes constitutionnels, c’est-à-dire les articles de la confédération, la constitution américaine ou encore les amendements, les interventions des pouvoirs constitués, les discours présidentiels les plus marquants, certaines lois et naturellement les grands arrêts rendus par la Cour suprême. Chaque document est accompagné d’un commentaire qui reprend le contexte et fournit une analyse juridique.

Ce premier tome s’ouvre avec la Déclaration d’indépendance en 1776 et se termine à la veille de la guerre de Sécession en 1860. Cette longue période correspond à l’édification d’une fédération, qui doit tenir compte de nombreuses tensions internes et d’une expansion territoriale ininterrompue.

Ce voyage dans le droit américain permet de mieux comprendre la richesse juridique de ce système qui a su allier débats historiques et questionnements politiques. Dans cette mesure, au-delà des contradictions nées de la pratique, cette étude illustre l’incroyable vitalité d’un droit sans cesse en évolution.

ISBN : 9782849341049

 

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6 octobre 2012 6 06 /10 /octobre /2012 07:01

titre de l'article:

Les transitions constitutionnelles après la guerre de sécession, les reconstructions de l'Union (1865-1877)

 

 

Cet article vient de paraître dans la Revue de la Recherche Juridique, droit prospectif, 2012/2, pp. 939-965

 

 

extrait:

" Texte fondamental et fondateur en droit, la Constitution d'un pays est aussi le reflet de ses principales caractéristiques, à un moment donné. La rédaction d'un tel texte obéit à des règles différentes en fonction des États mais se place toujours dans des circonstances historiques et politiques particulières qui influencent son contenu. De nombreuses études ont été menées sur les périodes de basculement constitutionnel c'est-à-dire sur ces instants particuliers dans l'histoire juridique d'une nation, instants de déséquilibre, de conflits et de transition. Ces dernières années, suite à des mouvements révolutionnaires, des transitions constitutionnelles ont été initiées dans plusieurs États. Il est même relativement aisé d’évoquer des phases de transitions, géographiquement définies, en fonction des périodes historiques.
Mais ce type de transition ne concerne pas seulement un État et son fonctionnement interne. Par le passé, des modifications constitutionnelles sont aussi intervenues à l'intérieur de structures ayant une tout autre nature juridique comme les Fédérations d’États. Dans un dispositif fédéral, par définition, il peut exister des Constitutions à plusieurs niveaux : au niveau fédéral tout d'abord puisqu'il s'agit du texte fondamental qui régit l'ensemble de la structure, au niveau des États ensuite puisque, dans les États fédérés, dans de nombreux cas, des Constitutions ont été mises en place. Qu'advient-il de ces textes lorsque des conflits majeurs surviennent au sein de l'organisation fédérale ? La question a une résonance pratique puisqu’elle s'est posé dans le courant du XIXe siècle aux États-Unis. Plus précisément, la question d'une modification éventuelle des Constitutions des États fédérés est apparue au centre du débat politique au lendemain de la Guerre de sécession. À cette date, le contenu même des Constitutions des États du Sud, vaincus à l'issue du conflit, a fait l'objet de multiples débats, juridiques et politiques.
L'utilisation du pluriel dans le titre de cet article est essentielle . Au premier abord, on pourrait y voir simplement une référence aux multiples Constitutions étatiques modifiées dans la Fédération américaine de l'après Guerre de sécession. 11 États ont ainsi été réintégrés au prix de modifications constitutionnelles majeures. Néanmoins, ce pluriel rend compte aussi de la spécificité de cette phase de l'Histoire américaine. La réintégration en question qui intervient au cours d'une phase dénommée Reconstruction est l'occasion de multiples transitions constitutionnelles, dans les Constitutions des États et dans la Constitution fédérale elle-même. Sur ce dernier point, le pluriel est également nécessaire car, bien que l'on évoque fréquemment la Reconstruction américaine , son étude a révélé une telle diversité dans son déroulement, dans ses principes, voire dans ses initiateurs, que parler de Reconstructions comme d'un phénomène pluriel paraît plus judicieux sur de nombreux points. Le présent article a pour dessein de réexaminer les différentes modifications constitutionnelles intervenues aux États-Unis entre 1865 et 1877 ainsi que leurs conséquences.
Une première précision, chronologique, paraît indispensable. Les deux bornes évoquées, 1865 et 1877, sont habituellement conférées pour définir la Reconstruction historiquement parlant. Avec la victoire du Nord, en 1865, s'achève un conflit juridique, politique et militaire commencé en 1860 et 1861. L'élection présidentielle de 1860 en est le catalyseur, mais les tensions entre les États ne font que croître depuis 1850. Deux tendances marquées apparaissent : d'un côté les partisans du Sud, favorables à l'esclavage et à sa consécration, et favorables à une certaine indépendance des États, de l'autre, les représentants du Nord, pour la plupart abolitionnistes, et attachés à l'Union. Entre les deux, des positions médianes, plus ou moins engagées, existent. À cet égard, les candidatures de 1860 fournissent un tableau pertinent. Quatre candidats sont en lice : un candidat républicain, Lincoln, hostile à l'esclavage, un candidat démocrate du Sud, Breckenridge, favorable à l'esclavage, un candidat démocrate du Nord, Douglas, en faveur d'une position médiane, et un candidat unioniste, Bell, qui prône avant tout le maintien de la Fédération au besoin en passant par un nouveau compromis. Lincoln l'emporte en nombre de grands électeurs. Mais, il est largement minoritaire dans les États du Sud. De surcroît, en voix, il n'obtient pas la majorité absolue. Le conflit juridique déclenché par les Déclarations de sécession des 11 États du Sud se transforme en guerre en 1861.
En 1865, la victoire du Nord devrait en toute logique conduire à la consécration des volontés du Nord : abolition de l'esclavage et soumission des États à l'Union. Dans les faits, cette approche semble par trop simpliste. La phase de Reconstruction proprement dite, entre 1865 et 1870, met déjà en lumière certaine failles du raisonnement (I). La seconde partie, entre 1870 et 1877, relativise considérablement les résultats pratiques de la transition constitutionnelle globale (II)."
 

 

 

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6 octobre 2012 6 06 /10 /octobre /2012 06:58

Cet article est paru dans la Revue Française de Droit constitutionnel en 2011

Revue française de droit constitutionnel
2011/4 (n° 88), pp. 681-707
extrait:

" « Les déclarations des droits de l'homme et du citoyen sont un produit direct de la philosophie du XVIIIe siècle et du mouvement d'esprit qu'elle a développé. Ce sont les principaux axiomes dégagés par les philosophes et les publicistes, comme les fondements d'une organisation politique juste et rationnelle, que proclamèrent solennellement les auteurs des constitutions nouvelles destinées à en faire l'application (…). Ce ne sont pas des articles de loi précis et exécutoires. Ce sont purement et simplement des déclarations de principes (…). La constitution de 1848, sous le titre de préambule et en huit articles, contient une véritable déclaration des droits et aussi des devoirs ; mais moins encore peut-être que celle de 1793 et de l'an III, cette déclaration n'a pas eu d'influence sur le développement de notre droit constitutionnel ». Cette citation est tirée des Eléments de droit constitutionnel français et comparé d'Adhémar Esmein. Elle illustre une position longtemps défendue par les publicistes français, visant à limiter l'importance juridique des textes introductifs des constitutions. Dans le même développement, Esmein compare les déclarations et les garanties des droits pour mettre en lumière l'importance revêtue, à ses yeux, par les secondes vis-à-vis des premières. Au regard des discussions et évolutions actuelles, et si l'on se réfère au droit positif, cette prise de position semble appartenir à l'histoire. Si l’on s’intéresse aux textes républicains récents, la question de la valeur du texte introductif occupe même une place particulière dans les études constitutionnelles. Ainsi, la valeur du préambule de 1958 a longtemps fait débat jusqu’à l’action prétorienne du conseil constitutionnel en 1971 ; celle du texte de 1946 a donné lieu à plusieurs travaux. Ce dernier exemple nous intéresse particulièrement car des différences majeures ont été soulignées entre les deux projets constitutionnels, concernant justement les textes introductifs. A cette date, certains n’ont pas hésité à souligner le changement survenu, un préambule remplaçant une déclaration des droits, et la faiblesse juridique du premier en comparaison de la seconde. Au premier abord, il serait aisé de faire une distinction entre des textes récents, dont les préambules sont importants, et les constitutions mises en place entre 1789 et 1848, qui, tout en comportant des textes introductifs, n'impliqueraient sur ce point précis aucune conséquence juridique majeure. Immédiatement, cette approche peut être nuancée puisque l'un de ces textes, la Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1789, occupe une place essentielle dans notre édifice juridique. On pourrait n'y voir qu'une exception à un principe global. Mais, une autre attitude n'est-elle pas justement possible ? Les débats qui ont conduit à l'adoption des différentes constitutions françaises sont autant d'indices et de jalons, permettant de comprendre l'essor de la pensée juridique au travers des questions abordées. Dans cette optique, opérer une relecture d'un des textes constitutionnels permet, dans un premier temps, d'étudier les conceptions juridiques des rédacteurs. Le choix de 1848 est d'autant plus pertinent, si l'on adopte ce point de vue, qu’un changement majeur s'est produit au cours de la discussion. L'examen de ce changement, dans un second temps, offre un regard renouvelé sur les débats juridiques concernant les textes introductifs mais également un prisme d'étude tenant compte à la fois des convictions politiques et juridiques et du contexte historique".

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29 septembre 2012 6 29 /09 /septembre /2012 04:39

le 13 octobre prochain, je serai au Conseil constitutionnel pour participer au salon du livre juridique.

vous trouverez ci-après les informations concernant cette journée.




4ème édition du Salon du Livre juridique

Le Club des Juristes et le Conseil constitutionnel organisent le samedi 13 octobre prochain de 10h à 18h, la 4ème édition du Salon du Livre juridique au Conseil constitutionnel, 2 rue Montpensier – 75001 Paris. Entrée libre


Cette année encore les principaux éditeurs juridiques ont répondu présent à l'instar de Lexis Nexis, Lextenso Editions, Dalloz, Economica, Les Editions Francis Lefebvre, Hachette, Mare et Martin, Nane Editions, Les Editions A. Pedone, PUF, la Revue Banque, les Editions du Seuil, la Société de législation comparée, Wolters Kluwer...


Près de 160 auteurs seront présents tout au long de la journée pour présenter leurs ouvrages, rencontrer le public et dédicacer leurs livres, notamment : Bernard AUDIT, Laurent AYNES, Jacques BEGUIN, Bernard BEIGNER, Alain BENABENT, Bernard BOULOC, Jean-Michel BRUGUIERE, Loïc CADIET, Guy CARCASSONNE,  Pierre DELVOLVE, Guillaume DRAGO, Yves GAUDEMET, Pierre-Yves GAUTIER, Bruno GENEVOIS, Pascale GONOD, Mattias GUYOMAR, Christophe JAMIN, Emmanuel JEULAND, Franck LAFFAILLE, Laurent LEVENEUR, Marceau LONG, Philippe MALAURIE, Bertrand MATHIEU, Denis MAZEAUD, Jacqueline MORAND-DEVILLER, Didier REBUT, Judith ROCHFELD, Jean ROSSETTO, Dominique ROUSSEAU, Bernard STIRN, Philippe STOFFEL-MUNCK, François TERRE, Bernard TEYSSIE, Michel TROPER, Didier TRUCHET, Michel VIVANT, Elisabeth ZOLLER...

 

Plusieurs événements rythmeront cette journée.

Le prix du livre juridique (qui récompense un ouvrage paru dans les douze derniers mois) sera remis à 11h30 par Madame TAUBIRA, garde des Sceaux, ministre de la justice.

Des visites du Conseil constitutionnel se dérouleront avec Jean-Louis DEBRE, Président du Conseil constitutionnel, de 14h30 à 16h30.

Douze « packs livres juridiques étudiants » sont à gagner en fonction de chaque niveau d'études. Un tirage au sort est organisé à 17 h. Les gagnants remportent ainsi la sélection de leurs livres pour l'année universitaire.

L'entrée du salon du livre juridique est libre.

Programme : http://www.salondulivrejuridique.fr/


Accès : M° Palais-Royal Musée du Louvre ou M° Pyramides

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15 septembre 2012 6 15 /09 /septembre /2012 07:25

 

voici les éléments de bibliographie donnés en cours .

 

 

Droit constitutionnel

Francis Hamon, Michel Troper

Editeur : LGDJ; Édition : 40e édition (septembre 2019)

Collection : MANUELS

EUR 35,00

 

Droit constitutionnel et Institutions politiques

Bertrand Mathieu, Philippe Ardant

662 pages

LGDJ; Édition : 31e édition (2019)

Collection : Manuels

EUR 35,00

 

Droit constitutionnel 

Pierre Pactet, Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien

Broché: 638 pages

Dalloz-Sirey;  37e édition (2019)

Collection : Sirey Université

EUR 34,00

 

Manuel de droit constitutionnel : Tome 1, Théorie générale, histoire, régimes étrangers
 
Julien Boudon
 
PUF, 3 juillet 2019
 
20, 00 EUR
 
 
Le Droit Constitutionnel en Tableaux

Arnaud Coutant

336 pages

Editeur : Ellipses Marketing (12 juillet 2016)

Collection : Le droit en fiches et en tableaux

25,00 EUR

 

des bibliographies thématiques seront fournies dans les différentes fiches de TD.

Bon courage

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11 juin 2012 1 11 /06 /juin /2012 04:39

Je viens de publier un article sur les élections présidentielles américaines en évoquant principalement les présidents élus sans majorité dans l'Histoire de l'Union.

références: RFDC 2012/2

Pour le consulter:

 

http://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-de-droit-constitutionnel-2012-2-page-35.htm

 

 

 

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27 mai 2012 7 27 /05 /mai /2012 05:03

 

le Discours reproduit ci-dessous est un exemple fascinant des difficiles rapports qui caractérisent le système constitutionnel américain. Suite à la crise de 1929, Roosevelt arrive au pouvoir avec un programme de réformes sociales et économiques. Face à l'hostilité de la cour suprême, il engage un véritable affrontement, en 1936-1937.

 

9 mars 1937: Discours de Franklin Roosevelt sur la Cour suprême

 

On "Court-Packing" (March 9, 1937)

Last Thursday I described in detail certain economic problems which everyone admits now face the Nation. For the many messages which have come to me after that speech, and which it is physically impossible to answer individually, I take this means of saying "thank you."

Tonight, sitting at my desk in the White House, I make my first radio report to the people in my second term of office.

I am reminded of that evening in March, four years ago, when I made my first radio report to you. We were then in the midst of the great banking crisis.

Soon after, with the authority of the Congress, we asked the Nation to turn over all of its privately held gold, dollar for dollar, to the Government of the United States.

Today's recovery proves how right that policy was.

But when, almost two years later, it came before the Supreme Court its constitutionality was upheld only by a five-to-four vote. The change of one vote would have thrown all the affairs of this great Nation back into hopeless chaos. In effect, four Justices ruled that the right under a private contract to exact a pound of flesh was more sacred than the main objectives of the Constitution to establish an enduring Nation.

In 1933 you and I knew that we must never let our economic system get completely out of joint again - that we could not afford to take the risk of another great depression.

We also became convinced that the only way to avoid a repetition of those dark days was to have a government with power to prevent and to cure the abuses and the inequalities which had thrown that system out of joint.

We then began a program of remedying those abuses and inequalities - to give balance and stability to our economic system - to make it bomb-proof against the causes of 1929.

Today we are only part-way through that program - and recovery is speeding up to a point where the dangers of 1929 are again becoming possible, not this week or month perhaps, but within a year or two.

National laws are needed to complete that program. Individual or local or state effort alone cannot protect us in 1937 any better than ten years ago.

It will take time - and plenty of time - to work out our remedies administratively even after legislation is passed. To complete our program of protection in time, therefore, we cannot delay one moment in making certain that our National Government has power to carry through.

Four years ago action did not come until the eleventh hour. It was almost too late.

If we learned anything from the depression we will not allow ourselves to run around in new circles of futile discussion and debate, always postponing the day of decision.

The American people have learned from the depression. For in the last three national elections an overwhelming majority of them voted a mandate that the Congress and the President begin the task of providing that protection - not after long years of debate, but now.

The Courts, however, have cast doubts on the ability of the elected Congress to protect us against catastrophe by meeting squarely our modern social and economic conditions.

We are at a crisis in our ability to proceed with that protection. It is a quiet crisis. There are no lines of depositors outside closed banks. But to the far-sighted it is far-reaching in its possibilities of injury to America.

I want to talk with you very simply about the need for present action in this crisis - the need to meet the unanswered challenge of one-third of a Nation ill-nourished, ill-clad, ill-housed.

Last Thursday I described the American form of Government as a three horse team provided by the Constitution to the American people so that their field might be plowed. The three horses are, of course, the three branches of government - the Congress, the Executive and the Courts. Two of the horses are pulling in unison today; the third is not. Those who have intimated that the President of the United States is trying to drive that team, overlook the simple fact that the President, as Chief Executive, is himself one of the three horses.

It is the American people themselves who are in the driver's seat.

It is the American people themselves who want the furrow plowed.

It is the American people themselves who expect the third horse to pull in unison with the other two.

I hope that you have re-read the Constitution of the United States in these past few weeks. Like the Bible, it ought to be read again and again.

It is an easy document to understand when you remember that it was called into being because the Articles of Confederation under which the original thirteen States tried to operate after the Revolution showed the need of a National Government with power enough to handle national problems. In its Preamble, the Constitution states that it was intended to form a more perfect Union and promote the general welfare; and the powers given to the Congress to carry out those purposes can be best described by saying that they were all the powers needed to meet each and every problem which then had a national character and which could not be met by merely local action.

But the framers went further. Having in mind that in succeeding generations many other problems then undreamed of would become national problems, they gave to the Congress the ample broad powers "to levy taxes ... and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States."

That, my friends, is what I honestly believe to have been the clear and underlying purpose of the patriots who wrote a Federal Constitution to create a National Government with national power, intended as they said, "to form a more perfect union ... for ourselves and our posterity."

For nearly twenty years there was no conflict between the Congress and the Court. Then Congress passed a statute which, in 1803, the Court said violated an express provision of the Constitution. The Court claimed the power to declare it unconstitutional and did so declare it. But a little later the Court itself admitted that it was an extraordinary power to exercise and through Mr. Justice Washington laid down this limitation upon it: "It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity and the patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its validity until its violation of the Constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt."

But since the rise of the modern movement for social and economic progress through legislation, the Court has more and more often and more and more boldly asserted a power to veto laws passed by the Congress and State Legislatures in complete disregard of this original limitation.

In the last four years the sound rule of giving statutes the benefit of all reasonable doubt has been cast aside. The Court has been acting not as a judicial body, but as a policy-making body.

When the Congress has sought to stabilize national agriculture, to improve the conditions of labor, to safeguard business against unfair competition, to protect our national resources, and in many other ways, to serve our clearly national needs, the majority of the Court has been assuming the power to pass on the wisdom of these acts of the Congress - and to approve or disapprove the public policy written into these laws.

That is not only my accusation. It is the accusation of most distinguished justices of the present Supreme Court. I have not the time to quote to you all the language used by dissenting justices in many of these cases. But in the case holding the Railroad Retirement Act unconstitutional, for instance, Chief Justice Hughes said in a dissenting opinion that the majority opinion was "a departure from sound principles," and placed "an unwarranted limitation upon the commerce clause." And three other justices agreed with him.

In the case of holding the AAA unconstitutional, Justice Stone said of the majority opinion that it was a "tortured construction of the Constitution." And two other justices agreed with him.

In the case holding the New York minimum wage law unconstitutional, Justice Stone said that the majority were actually reading into the Constitution their own " personal economic predilections," and that if the legislative power is not left free to choose the methods of solving the problems of poverty, subsistence, and health of large numbers in the community, then "government is to be rendered impotent." And two other justices agreed with him.

In the face of these dissenting opinions, there is no basis for the claim made by some members of the Court that something in the Constitution has compelled them regretfully to thwart the will of the people.

In the face of such dissenting opinions, it is perfectly clear that, as Chief Justice Hughes has said, "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is."

The Court in addition to the proper use of its judicial functions has improperly set itself up as a third house of the Congress - a super-legislature, as one of the justices has called it - reading into the Constitution words and implications which are not there, and which were never intended to be there.

We have, therefore, reached the point as a nation where we must take action to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself. We must find a way to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to the Constitution itself. We want a Supreme Court which will do justice under the Constitution and not over it. In our courts we want a government of laws and not of men.

I want - as all Americans want - an independent judiciary as proposed by the framers of the Constitution. That means a Supreme Court that will enforce the Constitution as written, that will refuse to amend the Constitution by the arbitrary exercise of judicial power - in other words by judicial say-so. It does not mean a judiciary so independent that it can deny the existence of facts which are universally recognized.

How then could we proceed to perform the mandate given us? It was said in last year's Democratic platform, "If these problems cannot be effectively solved within the Constitution, we shall seek such clarifying amendment as will assure the power to enact those laws, adequately to regulate commerce, protect public health and safety, and safeguard economic security." In other words, we said we would seek an amendment only if every other possible means by legislation were to fail.

When I commenced to review the situation with the problem squarely before me, I came by a process of elimination to the conclusion that, short of amendments, the only method which was clearly constitutional, and would at the same time carry out other much needed reforms, was to infuse new blood into all our Courts. We must have men worthy and equipped to carry out impartial justice. But, at the same time, we must have Judges who will bring to the Courts a present-day sense of the Constitution - Judges who will retain in the Courts the judicial functions of a court, and reject the legislative powers which the courts have today assumed.

In forty-five out of the forty-eight States of the Union, Judges are chosen not for life but for a period of years. In many States Judges must retire at the age of seventy. Congress has provided financial security by offering life pensions at full pay for Federal Judges on all Courts who are willing to retire at seventy. In the case of Supreme Court Justices, that pension is $20,000 a year. But all Federal Judges, once appointed, can, if they choose, hold office for life, no matter how old they may get to be.

What is my proposal? It is simply this: whenever a Judge or Justice of any Federal Court has reached the age of seventy and does not avail himself of the opportunity to retire on a pension, a new member shall be appointed by the President then in office, with the approval, as required by the Constitution, of the Senate of the United States.

That plan has two chief purposes. By bringing into the judicial system a steady and continuing stream of new and younger blood, I hope, first, to make the administration of all Federal justice speedier and, therefore, less costly; secondly, to bring to the decision of social and economic problems younger men who have had personal experience and contact with modern facts and circumstances under which average men have to live and work. This plan will save our national Constitution from hardening of the judicial arteries.

The number of Judges to be appointed would depend wholly on the decision of present Judges now over seventy, or those who would subsequently reach the age of seventy.

If, for instance, any one of the six Justices of the Supreme Court now over the age of seventy should retire as provided under the plan, no additional place would be created. Consequently, although there never can be more than fifteen, there may be only fourteen, or thirteen, or twelve. And there may be only nine.

There is nothing novel or radical about this idea. It seeks to maintain the Federal bench in full vigor. It has been discussed and approved by many persons of high authority ever since a similar proposal passed the House of Representatives in 1869.

Why was the age fixed at seventy? Because the laws of many States, the practice of the Civil Service, the regulations of the Army and Navy, and the rules of many of our Universities and of almost every great private business enterprise, commonly fix the retirement age at seventy years or less.

The statute would apply to all the courts in the Federal system. There is general approval so far as the lower Federal courts are concerned. The plan has met opposition only so far as the Supreme Court of the United States itself is concerned. If such a plan is good for the lower courts it certainly ought to be equally good for the highest Court from which there is no appeal.

Those opposing this plan have sought to arouse prejudice and fear by crying that I am seeking to "pack" the Supreme Court and that a baneful precedent will be established.

What do they mean by the words "packing the Court"?

Let me answer this question with a bluntness that will end all honest misunderstanding of my purposes.

If by that phrase "packing the Court" it is charged that I wish to place on the bench spineless puppets who would disregard the law and would decide specific cases as I wished them to be decided, I make this answer: that no President fit for his office would appoint, and no Senate of honorable men fit for their office would confirm, that kind of appointees to the Supreme Court. But if by that phrase the charge is made that I would appoint and the Senate would confirm Justices worthy to sit beside present members of the Court who understand those modern conditions, that I will appoint Justices who will not undertake to override the judgment of the Congress on legislative policy, that I will appoint Justices who will act as Justices and not as legislators - if the appointment of such Justices can be called "packing the Courts," then I say that I and with me the vast majority of the American people favor doing just that thing- now.

Is it a dangerous precedent for the Congress to change the number of the Justices? The Congress has always had, and will have, that power. The number of justices has been changed several times before, in the Administration of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson - both signers of the Declaration of Independence - Andrew jackson, Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant.

I suggest only the addition of Justices to the bench in accordance with a clearly defined principle relating to a clearly defined age limit. Fundamentally, if in the future, America cannot trust the Congress it elects to refrain from abuse of our Constitutional usages, democracy will have failed far beyond the importance to it of any king of precedent concerning the Judiciary.

We think it so much in the public interest to maintain a vigorous judiciary that we encourage the retirement of elderly Judges by offering them a life pension at full salary. Why then should we leave the fulfillment of this public policy to chance or make independent on upon the desire or prejudice of any individual Justice?

It is the clear intention of our public policy to provide for a constant flow of new and younger blood into the Judiciary. Normally every President appoints a large number of District and Circuit Court Judges and a few members of the Supreme Court. Until my first term practically every President of the United States has appointed at least one member of the Supreme Court. President Taft appointed five members and named a Chief Justice; President Wilson, three; President Harding, four, including a Chief Justice; President Coolidge, one; President Hoover, three, including a Chief Justice.

Such a succession of appointments should have provided a Court well-balanced as to age. But chance and the disinclination of individuals to leave the Supreme bench have now given us a Court in which five Justices will be over seventy-five years of age before next June and one over seventy. Thus a sound public policy has been defeated.

I now propose that we establish by law an assurance against any such ill-balanced Court in the future. I propose that hereafter, when a Judge reaches the age of seventy, a new and younger Judge shall be added to the Court automatically. In this way I propose to enforce a sound public policy by law instead of leaving the composition of our Federal Courts, including the highest, to be determined by chance or the personal indecision of individuals.

If such a law as I propose is regarded as establishing a new precedent, is it not a most desirable precedent?

Like all lawyers, like all Americans, I regret the necessity of this controversy. But the welfare of the United States, and indeed of the Constitution itself, is what we all must think about first. Our difficulty with the Court today rises not from the Court as an institution but from human beings within it. But we cannot yield our constitutional destiny to the personal judgement of a few men who, being fearful of the future, would deny us the necessary means of dealing with the present.

This plan of mine is no attack on the Court; it seeks to restore the Court to its rightful and historic place in our Constitutional Government and to have it resume its high task of building anew on the Constitution "a system of living law." The Court itself can best undo what the Court has done.

I have thus explained to you the reasons that lie behind our efforts to secure results by legislation within the Constitution. I hope that thereby the difficult process of constitutional amendment may be rendered unnecessary. But let us examine the process.

There are many types of amendment proposed. Each one is radically different from the other. There is no substantial groups within the Congress or outside it who are agreed on any single amendment.

It would take months or years to get substantial agreement upon the type and language of the amendment. It would take months and years thereafter to get a two-thirds majority in favor of that amendment in both Houses of the Congress.

Then would come the long course of ratification by three-fourths of all the States. No amendment which any powerful economic interests or the leaders of any powerful political party have had reason to oppose has ever been ratified within anything like a reasonable time. And thirteen states which contain only five percent of the voting population can block ratification even though the thirty-five States with ninety-five percent of the population are in favor of it.

A very large percentage of newspaper publishers, Chambers of Commerce, Bar Association, Manufacturers' Associations, who are trying to give the impression that they really do want a constitutional amendment would be the first to exclaim as soon as an amendment was proposed, "Oh! I was for an amendment all right, but this amendment you proposed is not the kind of amendment that I was thinking about. I am therefore, going to spend my time, my efforts and my money to block the amendment, although I would be awfully glad to help get some other kind of amendment ratified."

Two groups oppose my plan on the ground that they favor a constitutional amendment. The first includes those who fundamentally object to social and economic legislation along modern lines. This is the same group who during the campaign last Fall tried to block the mandate of the people.

Now they are making a last stand. And the strategy of that last stand is to suggest the time-consuming process of amendment in order to kill off by delay the legislation demanded by the mandate.

To them I say: I do not think you will be able long to fool the American people as to your purposes.

The other groups is composed of those who honestly believe the amendment process is the best and who would be willing to support a reasonable amendment if they could agree on one.

To them I say: we cannot rely on an amendment as the immediate or only answer to our present difficulties. When the time comes for action, you will find that many of those who pretend to support you will sabotage any constructive amendment which is proposed. Look at these strange bed-fellows of yours. When before have you found them really at your side in your fights for progress?

And remember one thing more. Even if an amendment were passed, and even if in the years to come it were to be ratified, its meaning would depend upon the kind of Justices who would be sitting on the Supreme Court Bench. An amendment, like the rest of the Constitution, is what the Justices say it is rather than what its framers or you might hope it is.

This proposal of mine will not infringe in the slightest upon the civil or religious liberties so dear to every American.

My record as Governor and President proves my devotion to those liberties. You who know me can have no fear that I would tolerate the destruction by any branch of government of any part of our heritage of freedom.

The present attempt by those opposed to progress to play upon the fears of danger to personal liberty brings again to mind that crude and cruel strategy tried by the same opposition to frighten the workers of America in a pay-envelope propaganda against the Social Security Law. The workers were not fooled by that propaganda then. The people of America will not be fooled by such propaganda now.

I am in favor of action through legislation:

First, because I believe that it can be passed at this session of the Congress.

Second, because it will provide a reinvigorated, liberal-minded Judiciary necessary to furnish quicker and cheaper justice from bottom to top.

Third, because it will provide a series of Federal Courts willing to enforce the Constitution as written, and unwilling to assert legislative powers by writing into it their own political and economic policies.

During the past half century the balance of power between the three great branches of the Federal Government, has been tipped out of balance by the Courts in direct contradiction of the high purposes of the framers of the Constitution. It is my purpose to restore that balance. You who know me will accept my solemn assurance that in a world in which democracy is under attack, I seek to make American democracy succeed. You and I will do our part

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29 mars 2012 4 29 /03 /mars /2012 16:38

1857: Dred Scott v. Sandford, quand la Cour suprême consacrait l’esclavage….

U. S. Supreme Court, Dred Scott, Plaintiff In Error v. John F. A. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).

 

Walter Ehrlich, They Have No Rights, Applewood Books, 2007, 288 p.

Don Edward Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: its significance in American law and politics, Oxford University Press, 2001, 741 p.

Ethan Greenberg, Dred Scott and the dangers of a political court, Rowman and Littlefield, 2009, 328 p.

 Earl M. Maltz, Dred Scott and the politics of slavery, University Press of Kansas, 2007, 182 p.

David Thomas Konig, Paul Finkelman, Christopher Alan Bracey, The Dred Scott Case: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Race and Law, Ohio University Press, 2010, 281 p.

Walter Ehrlich, « The Origins of the Dred Scott Case », Journal of Negro History, vol. 59, 2, 1974, 132-142.

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7 février 2012 2 07 /02 /février /2012 14:14

Certains textes sont marquants dans l'Histoire constitutionnelle américaine. Le XIe Amendement en fait partie.

Il concerne les procès contre les Etats et est symbolique du rapport entre Etat et Union au lendemain de la ratification du texte constitutionnel.

pour plus d'éléments on peut consulter :

Ouvrages:
Maeva Marcus, James R. Perry, The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800: Suits against states, Volume 5 de The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800, Columbia University Press, 1995, 686 p.;
Melvyn R. Durchslag, State sovereign immunity: a reference guide to the United States Constitution, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002, 176 p.;
Clyde Edward Jacobs, The Eleventh amendment and sovereign immunity, Greenwood Press, 1972, 216 p.;
John V. Orth, The judicial power of the United States: the eleventh amendment in American history, Oxford University Press, 1987, 231 p.

Articles,
 Erwin Chemerinsky, « The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial Review, Sovereign Immunity and the Rehnquist Court », Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 33, 2000, 1283-1308;
Erwin Chemerinsky, « State Sovereignty and Federal Court Power: The Eleventh Amendment after Pennhurst v. Halderman », Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 1985, vol. 12, 643-668 ;
Jesse H. Choper, John C. Yoo, « Who’s afraid of The Eleventh Amendment? The Limited Impact of The Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings », Columbia Law Review, vol. 106, 213-261,
 Bradford R. Clark, « The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union », Harvard Law Review, juin 2010, vol. 123, 8, 1817-1918;
William A. Fletcher, « A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction », Stanford Law Review, 1983, vol. 35, 1033-1063 ;
William D. Guthrie, « The Eleventh Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States », Columbia Law Review, vol. 8, 3, Mars 1908, 183-207;
 James E. Pfander, « History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh Amendment », Cornell Law Review 1998, vol. 83, 1269-1352;
LeRoy G. Pilling, « An Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment », Michigan Law Review, vol. 15, 6, avril 1917, 468-477;
Mark Strasser, « Chisholm, The Eleventh Amendment, and Sovereign Immunity: on Alden’s return to Confederation principles », Florida State University Law Review, 2001, vol. 28, 605-648 ;
A. H. Wintersteen, « The Eleventh Amendment and the Nonsuability of the State », The American Law Register (1852-1891), vol. 39,  1, 1-15.

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18 décembre 2011 7 18 /12 /décembre /2011 16:08

David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History, Harvard University Press, 2008, 300 p.

Carl Lotus Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas, BiblioLife, 2008 (1ère édition Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922, 286 p.), 300 p.

Julian P. Boyd, Declaration of Independence: The Evolution of the Text , DIANE Publishing Company, 2010, 102 p.

William Hogeland, Declaration: The Nine Tumultuous Weeks When America Became Independent, May 1-July 4, 1776, Simon and Schuster, 2010, 273 p.

 Gary John Kornblith, Slavery and sectional strife in the early American republic, 1776-1821, Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, 165 p.

Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence, Paw Prints, 2008, 304 p.

Allen Jayne, Jefferson's Declaration of Independence: Origins, Philosophy, and Theology, University Press of Kentucky, 2000, 320 p.

Garry Wills, Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2002, 398 p.

Scott D. Gerber, To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation, New-York University Press, 1996, 256 p.

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